



Moments in MI History

How Did We Get Here?

The U.S. Army Intelligence School Moves to Fort Huachuca (Part 4 of 4)

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This year is the 50th anniversary of Fort Huachuca as the Home of Military Intelligence. In recognition of this significant milestone, *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* (MIPB) is publishing a history of how Army intelligence training transitioned from being scattered across the United States after World War II to its current location at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, in 1971. MIPB will publish this story in four parts.

January–March 2021 issue

- ◆ The Story Begins at Fort Holabird.
- ◆ What’s Wrong with Fort Holabird?
- ◆ MG Joseph McChristian and the Intelligence Center Concept.

April–June 2021 issue

- ◆ Blakefield Report Recommends Fort Huachuca.
- ◆ Could Fort Lewis Be a Better Answer?

July–September 2021 issue

- ◆ The Smith Study.
- ◆ Readyng the New Home.

July–September 2021 issue–Bonus Column

- ◆ Congressional Blowback.
- ◆ The Realization of a Dream.

Author’s Note: All primary documents used in the writing of this article are in the historical documents collection at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence. This includes correspondence related to the various studies, study reports, newspaper articles, testimony and statements given during the congressional hearings, the Army’s information papers in preparation for the congressional hearings, the General Accounting Office’s report, and the final report of the congressional subcommittee. Also used were the annual historical reports of the U.S. Army Intelligence School for 1966 to 1970 and the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School for 1971 and 1972.

Introduction

On 4 May 1971, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) Commandant COL Charles W. Allen and CSM Clyde Fields unfurled the school colors at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and proclaimed USAICS open for business. This action concluded an almost 5-year effort to find the ideal “home” for military intelligence (MI). The story involves multiple staff studies and cost analyses, congressional investigations and hearings, careful movement planning, and critical liaison between the staff at Fort Holabird, Maryland, and Fort Huachuca. Ultimately, it was the first step to the consolidation of several disparate Army intelligence training efforts into one entity now known as the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence.

Congressional Blowback

While personnel at USAICS were gearing up to train the Army’s intelligence personnel, members of Congress were

preparing to reopen the case on the school’s relocation. On 21 April 1971, New York Congressman Otis Pike, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, requested MG Joseph McChristian, Department of the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, visit his office to discuss Fort Lewis, Washington, as an option for the intelligence center, rather than Fort Huachuca. In response, the Army sent a fact sheet contrasting the advantages and disadvantages of Fort Huachuca and Fort Lewis. A month later, Maryland Congressman Clarence Long, who had been against the closure of Fort Holabird since the beginning, wrote a letter to Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor requesting that the Army reverse the decision to move the school to Fort Huachuca. Members of the Military Construction Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, responding to constituents’ complaints about the housing situation at Fort Huachuca, called a June hearing at which

they reprimanded the Army for providing Congress with inadequate data. Finally, not happy with what he called the Army's "evasions and mush," Congressman Pike requested the General Accounting Office (GAO) conduct an audit of the move.¹

GAO began its investigation on 26 July 1971 and published its final report on 15 March 1972 amid accusations by Congressmen Long and Pike that the Army had intentionally delayed its publication until the Intelligence Center reached full operations at Fort Huachuca.² While the Army's counsel deemed the report impartial, Congressman Long used the report as evidence that the Army had "deliberately deceived" Congress and the public by withholding information about the water and housing problems at Fort Huachuca. He charged that "the Army did not tell Congress that its move to Fort Huachuca was a mere ploy in its real ambition to set up a 10,000-man Intelligence Center in the Arizona desert."³ The Army responded to Congressman Long's accusations admitting its error in estimating the housing situation but defending its efforts to ensure the Intelligence Center established at Fort Huachuca would not exacerbate the water problems.⁴

Congressman Pike used the GAO report to call for official hearings before a Special Subcommittee of the Armed Forces Investigation Subcommittee, which took place on 10 May 1972. In his opening statement, Congressman Pike argued that the Army had not been fully supportive of the subcommittee's investigation or the GAO study. This had hindered the subcommittee's ability to "develop all of the basic facts necessary for a valid judgement" about whether the Army had made the best decision to move the Intelligence Center to Fort Huachuca.⁵ Congressman Long then testified at length about the housing situation and concluded that the move from Fort Holabird was an "expensive transfer for which there was no real military justification."⁶ The Director of the GAO's Logistics and Communications Division, J. Kenneth Fasick, called the Army's planning "inadequate" and agreed with Congressman Long that "this was not a good example of a case study for relocation of military bases."⁷

Congressman Pike's star witness seemed to be MG McChristian, now retired, who recounted his efforts to achieve a large, integrated intelligence center and his preference for Fort Lewis. While he believed that Army Chief of Staff GEN William C. Westmoreland favored his more extensive concept of an intelligence center, he understood the myriad considerations that had to go into the final decision and the reasons why the Army Chief of Staff approved Fort Huachuca. He testified that "I believed in this center very

strongly" and while "it is better at [Fort] Huachuca today than it was at [Fort] Holabird," he lamented, his recommendations were overruled. Congressman Pike concluded, "You have been on the side of angels through this."⁸

BG Oliver Dillard, the Director of Intelligence Support in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, read a prepared statement that was cut short because of time.



BG Oliver Dillard was chosen to represent the U.S. Army at the congressional hearings in 1972.

BG Dillard stressed that much of the confusion was due to a misunderstanding of the myriad studies conducted for two interrelated but separate subjects—the move of U.S. Army Intelligence School (USAINTS) from Fort Holabird to Fort Huachuca and the Intelligence Center Concept. He stated, "Somehow the early conceptual studies and documents, which were part of the decision making process, but which did not represent formal decisions, were mistakenly credited by some people as being the final Army decision. Thus, the issues involving the move of the school and the plans for an Intelligence Center became distorted."⁹ MG Linton S. Boatwright, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel's Director of Individual Training and chairman of a Long-Range Stationing Study Group (LRSSG), also testified, stressing that in making the recommendation to move USAINTS to Fort Huachuca, his LRSSG took into account the availability of housing, requirements for long-range construction, and water limitations. For all the advantages that Fort Huachuca had over other installations, "I strongly felt, and I still strongly feel, that from an operational point of view Fort Huachuca is the place for the Intelligence Center."¹⁰

The subcommittee report was published on 12 July 1972. In summarizing its findings, the report accused the Army of pre-choosing Fort Huachuca as the location of the intelligence center before conducting adequate studies, then "painting over the shortcomings...to justify its selection"

and tailoring its Intelligence Center Concept to fit existing conditions. It further stated, “If a qualitative improvement in intelligence was required, and if the Center was to satisfy that requirement, the Army has chosen to dispense with that improvement by its acceptance of the abbreviated Center/Team. It appears that is a high price to pay for the luxury of not admitting a mistake in the selection of Fort Huachuca.” In addition to suggesting that the Secretary of Defense establish a standard format for future relocation and closure studies and cost analyses, the subcommittee recommended that the Army relook at its Intelligence Center Concept and determine, “from the standpoint of economy and efficiency,” if it would be better located at Fort Lewis or some other “suitable” location.¹¹

Regardless of the subcommittee’s findings, the Army maintained that selecting Fort Huachuca as the site of the Intelligence Center and School was not a mistake. No installation within the continental United States could have supported MG McChristian’s full Intelligence Center Concept without additional relocations and transfers of other activities, which would have substantially added to the cost. Consequently, MG McChristian’s Intelligence Center Concept was never approved. Instead, the Smith Board reconfirmed the more immediate and practical need to find a location where the Army could better train its intelligence personnel and collocate them with their counterparts in the Combat Developments Command Intelligence Agency in accordance with the original U.S. Army Continental Army Command Center Concept. The various studies conducted in late 1969 and early 1970 clearly showed that Fort Huachuca was ideal for training, as well as developing and testing sensitive intelligence equipment. The post’s superior advantages—good classrooms, plenty of airspace and training space, and an uncluttered electromagnetic spectrum—also checked off many of MG McChristian’s requirements for an adequate intelligence center. Responding to the subcommittee’s report, Secretary of the Army Robert Froehlke, who had been appointed to the position in July 1971 upon the resignation of Secretary Resor, expressed concern over accusations that the Army had “deliberately engaged in a scheme to deceive Congress and the American public.”

He further stressed that “the operational reasons for selecting Fort Huachuca are sound and, when other Army stationing considerations have been taken into account, Fort Huachuca is the most appropriate location for the center. Therefore, I consider a further study—raising the specter of again moving the school and those personnel who moved to Fort Huachuca—to be unnecessary.”¹²

The Realization of a Dream

By the time the congressional hearings had come to a close, the USAICS had been operating at Fort Huachuca for more than a year. Instructors and staff, as well as the Army’s senior intelligence leaders were generally positive about the new location, stating, “The advantages of the move have generally been realized. In addition,



Robert Froehlke, Secretary of the Army, July 1971 to May 1973.

there has been a significant heightening of the morale of both students and instructors brought about by the move from the crowded, grimy [Fort] Holabird to the clean desert air of [Fort] Huachuca.”¹³

Within the first year of operations at Huachuca, USAICS staff and faculty had developed new Noncommissioned Officer Basic and Advanced courses, stood up a task force to develop the program of instruction for the new MI Officer Basic Course, added field training exercises to courses that had never had them, and submitted for approval plans for the construction of a new academic complex to replace the World War II buildings the center and school were currently using. In 1973, the Combat Developments Command Intelligence Agency made its move to Fort Huachuca, and USAICS absorbed the Combat Surveillance and Electronic Warfare School. The first MI Officer Basic Course started on 29 March, the realization of a long-desired goal. In addition to being authorized its own shoulder sleeve insignia, USAICS was also authorized a general officer as commander. On 7 May 1973, BG Harry Hiestand took command of USAICS replacing COL Elvin Dalton, who had shepherded the center through its first 2 years at the Arizona location.

In the coming years, USAICS continued to grow. In October 1976, responsibility for the Army Security Agency Training Center and School and the Army Security Agency Combat Development Activity at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, transferred to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), which in turn placed those organizations under the command of USAICS. In the process, the Army Security Agency school was redesignated the U.S. Army Intelligence School Devens (USAISD).



Headquarters of the U.S. Army Intelligence School at Fort Devens.

Responsibility for all MI training was now consolidated at USAICS, but training was still being conducted at four locations: USAICS at Fort Huachuca; USAISD at Fort Devens; the USAISD Detachment at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas; and the USAISD Detachment at Corry Station, Florida.¹⁴

The final step in the consolidation occurred on 1 October 1990, when TRADOC assumed command of Fort Huachuca as part of the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) initiative. The U.S. Army Information Systems Command (formerly the Strategic Communications Command and known today as NETCOM) became a tenant activity on post, while the U.S. Army Intelligence Center became the post's senior mission. BRAC 1988 also resulted in the transfer of all the training elements of USAISD to Fort Huachuca.

This move was completed in 1994. After more than a quarter of a century of effort, Fort Huachuca had finally become the "Home of Military Intelligence" in an all-embracing sense. 🌟



Aerial view of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center complex in the mid-1990s.

Endnotes

1. *Testimony before the Armed Services Subcomm. of the Comm. on Armed Services, House of Representatives, on Relocation of the U.S. Army Intelligence School from Fort Holabird to Fort Huachuca, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess.* (10 May 1972) (statement of Congressman Otis Pike), 1.
2. In fact, the report had not been ready for security review until 11 February 1972, and the Department of the Army completed its review on 18 February, stating while the report was not classified, it did have stationing information that had not yet been approved. The Army asked that the report not be publicly released.
3. "Long Charges Army Deceit in Holabird Move," *Baltimore News-American*, 25 March 1972.
4. In January 1972, the Army had requested \$2.6 million to construct an additional 100-family housing units. They now identified a deficit of 974 units.
5. *Testimony before Armed Services Subcomm.* (statement of Congressman Pike), 2.
6. *Testimony before Armed Services Subcomm.* (statement of Congressman Clarence D. Long), 6.
7. *Testimony before Armed Services Subcomm.* (statement of J. Kenneth Fasick, Director, Logistics and Communications Division, General Accounting Office), 12; and *Testimony before Armed Services Subcomm.* (statement of Congressman Long), 7.
8. *Testimony before Armed Services Subcomm.* (statement of MG Joseph McChristian), 17, 24.
9. *Testimony before the Armed Forces Investigating Subcomm.* (10 May 1972) (statement of BG Oliver Dillard, Director, Intelligence Support, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence), 12; and *Testimony before Armed Services Subcomm.* (statement of BG Dillard), 40–41.
10. *Testimony before Armed Services Subcomm.* (statement of MG Linton S. Boatwright), 52.
11. *Report of the Armed Services Investigating Subcomm. of the Comm. on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Relocation of the US Army Intelligence School from Fort Holabird to Fort Huachuca, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess.* (12 July 1972), 2, 3, 5, 13.
12. Secretary of the Army Robert Froehke to Honorable F. Edward Hebert, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, letter, 22 September 1972.
13. MAJ Kilday, *Information Brief: Advantages of Locating the Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca*, n.d.
14. Because the U.S. Air Force was executive agent for cryptologic analysis and reporting and the U.S. Navy was executive agent for non-communications signals analysis, Army students trained at Goodfellow Air Force Base and Corry Station, respectively, for those missions.