Fighting the Division Intelligence Enterprise in Large-Scale Ground Combat Operations

by Lieutenant Colonel James Leidenberg

Introduction

In the face of emerging global threats, peer and near-peer adversaries are pushing the bounds of competition and threatening our allies and partners with increasing capabilities. U.S. Army divisions are designed to be the lethal warfighting force able to execute Army and joint force operations to win decisively against these threats. In counterinsurgency operations, brigade combat teams (BCTs) were the front line of defense and bore the weight of planning and executing operations, fires, and maneuver. The self-reliance and independence of BCTs became the hallmark of decentralized mission command to overwhelm militant and insurgent threats. Today's challenges require divisions and corps to have a more central role in responding to threats. This article will discuss how to train and prepare the division intelligence enterprise to meet the challenges that the Army faces as it shifts its warfighting focus from the BCT to the division's readiness.

Role of Division Intelligence

Division intelligence teams gain and maintain contact with the enemy to focus the lethal and nonlethal targeting efforts that enable BCTs to close with and destroy the enemy. Lethality in large-scale ground combat operations requires precision and speed. At the point of the spear is the division intelligence enterprise to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. The primary role of intelligence leaders is to direct the intelligence process providing lethality-driven intelligence to win decisively. *Lethality-driven intelligence* is the timely, accurate, precise, and predictive intelligence that enables maneuver commanders to position forces and capabilities at the right location, at the right time, and in the right posture to close with and destroy the enemy. Lethality is measured in terms of the *potential* for something (a formation or a system) to effectively deliver and cause the desired lethal effects. It is assessed by two relative conditions:

✦ *Preparedness (readiness)* to deliver lethal effects.

✦ *Posture in terms of proximity (ability to make contact)* as expressed over time and distance from the object receiving the lethal effect.

All steps of the intelligence process must operate optimally with integrated and resilient architecture to provide lethality-driven intelligence. Intelligence leaders drive the speed, focus, and precision of the intelligence enterprise by executing intelligence support to the warfighter to meet the commander's needs so that they understand the enemy and terrain across time, space, and distance. Division intelligence leaders must master—

✦ Doctrine and the fundamentals of warfighting (understand and apply knowledge of all warfighting functions and lead the intelligence preparation of the battlefield [IPB] process).

✦ Targeting requirements and process for the lethal precision needed to win through the decide-detect-deliver-assess methodology.

✦ Collection management with an understanding of mission management and requirements management.

✦ The intelligence architecture.

Training Focus Areas for the Division

As technology and knowledge have become more prolific and accessible in even the world's most remote corners, our competitive advantages are challenged across all domains. The strategic environment is in a state of continuous competition. To prevail in providing the understanding needed to win decisively, we must retrain the intelligence enterprise to dominate when contested. Our technology is only as strong as our processes and systems that generate the understanding. We must be able to adapt to fight for understanding even when technology is no longer able to power our assessments. 1st Cavalry Division's approach relies on three training areas to ensure the division intelligence enterprise is ready. A robust and resilient intelligence architecture must underpin these areas to ensure continuous communication at echelon:

✦ Training Focus Area 1: Deploy ready to connect to the enterprise.

✦ Training Focus Area 2: Master the planning basics.

✦ Training Focus Area 3: Synchronize information collection operations.

Training Focus Area 1: Deploy Ready to Connect to the Enterprise

The division must be ready to connect to the national to tactical intelligence enterprise. Readiness for a division begins with the ability to leverage the full intelligence community ahead of conflict. In large-scale ground combat operations, Army intelligence units at every echelon must arrive connected to the enterprise to enable maneuver and fires to rapidly deploy to fight and win decisively. The First Team gained direct experience of the challenges awaiting their arrival in a new theater while executing a real-world deployment exercise to Europe as part of DEFENDER-Europe 20. For rapid deployments, divisions must coordinate with the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command's military intelligence brigade-theater ahead of movement to prepare architecture connections in sanctuary, thereby enabling a rapid connection upon their arrival in the theater. Division intelligence teams must be "ready now." This requires a warm start of intelligence systems and architecture to provide enough time to react to uncertain conditions. Intelligence teams can quickly provide initial assessments to commanders to make informed and sound decisions. Intelligence systems and processes must be integrated with higher, lateral, and subordinate units and connected to the entire intelligence enterprise. Intelligence Soldiers must be well trained and certified at every echelon to the high levels of proficiency required for executing mission-essential tasks. This proficiency must be trained and validated across echelons at every opportunity. The unique requirements of the intelligence warfighting function require an enterprise

approach. Interconnectivity, dependencies, and standardization are key to effectively and efficiently delivering our core product—timely, accurate, precise, and predictive lethality-driven intelligence to enable fires and maneuver.

Three general lessons emerged from deploying the entire division's intelligence team. These lessons apply to future readiness in large-scale ground combat operations:

Train Accountability and Equipment Tracking at Every Opportunity. In preparation for movement to the field or even when doing inventories, leverage opportunities to train accounting for and deploying intelligence systems as single end items. When they arrive at the training location, track the time required to establish the system. This rigor enables intelligence leaders to know their systems at the division and below level and to measure the effectiveness and readiness to establish the system in tactical conditions. This also enables an evaluation of preconfiguration and preparedness for systems to rapidly support operations. Validate details such as the container and loadout timeline and the pack-out plan. Also, prepare the strategic lift support paperwork as an opportunity to ensure current measurements are available for short-notice strategic movements. Each request for equipment movement will come with a litany of additional requirements.

Build Relationships in the Training Environment. Train by connecting into the theater and corps intelligence teams during field training exercises and command post exercises to build the processes and relationships needed for an intelligence picture that is nested with higher. Likewise, when the division trains, it builds processes to support subordinate brigade intelligence development in events such as the Military Intelligence Training Strategy certification. When notified for deployment, division intelligence teams will leverage these connections to the national, theater, and tactical intelligence enterprise to support force projection and expeditionary capacity as detailed in FM 3-0, *Operations*.[1] The intelligence enterprise is powered through relationships. In deploying, theater and national intelligence teams can answer the commander's critical intelligence requirements during the force projection process. Once established in the theater, the deploying unit's (the division or its subordinate units) organic intelligence assets are distributed across the area of operations to answer the intelligence needs. In sum, preparedness to connect at every echelon to the larger intelligence enterprise is foundational for intelligence readiness. Well-established relationships are important to achieve this preparedness.

Train Realistically to Achieve Synchronization. Time matters in a contested environment. In training, it is important

to ensure that all movement is tactical and synchronized so that systems are able to connect quickly to the enterprise. Align movement timelines for arrival and setup to synchronize the arrival of key personnel with equipment. Leaders must know when, how, and how much bandwidth should be requested for intelligence operations. Intelligence leaders must maintain awareness of the timeline for mission requirements, like risk reduction exercises, to ensure the arrival and availability of the required equipment and Soldiers to maintain and set up that equipment. Understand the timeline for agricultural cleaning, strategic lift requirements for classified and mission-critical systems, and line haul requirements for low-density equipment so that those moving do not damage or break it in transit to its final destination. Load plans and accountability of all subcomponents associated with each system are vital not only to the single end item shipment but also to mission accomplishment. A single cord missing in a contested environment can have significant operational impacts. Sustained deployment readiness training ahead of exercises and mobilization is critical to the successful mobilization and employment of intelligence equipment.

Photo by SSG Kelsey Miller, 1st Cavalry Division Sustainment Brigade

Troopers from the 1st Cavalry Division conducted a simulated tactical command post exercise during Warfighter 21-01 in order to ensure the integration and readiness of the division staff, as well as test the command post systems and processes for operations in October 2020.

Training Area 2: Master the Planning Basics

The division intelligence teams must master the planning and targeting requirements to bring lethality. Lethality-driven intelligence products and processes focus on enabling the commander to synchronize desired effects at every echelon at a time and place of our choosing in order to dominate our enemies and win decisively. Production of all "fighting products" is nested at every echelon to focus the entire division on the critical aspects of the enemy and terrain through common understanding. The products and production are not as important as the analytics behind the products. Cyclical analytical evaluations, iterative feedback for key processes (information collection and targeting), and assessments of the overall effectiveness of fighting products are the primary driver for future requirements in the next iteration of the intelligence process. Learning is continuous and makes the division increasingly lethal through contact.

Military Decision-Making Process. At the division level, the G-2 must support the intelligence planner in the G-5 with continuous updates for the planner's intelligence running estimate. The planner leverages a comprehensive running estimate with key products, references, and a playbook of enemy actions to provide realistic estimates of future enemy actions beyond the scope of the event template. Honing lethality requires deliberate planning. Synchronization is achieved through the military decision-making process (MDMP). MDMP is an "iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order."[2] The intelligence plans officer must have a thorough understanding of all the warfighting functions to integrate intelligence during planning.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. FM 2-0, *Intelligence,* describes "a number of challenges in order to successfully conduct large-scale combat operations. Foremost among those challenges are peer threats, who are highly adaptive, technologically advanced, and operate at a tempo and depth that greatly complicates Army forces' ability to respond to threat actions throughout the range of military operations."[3] The command and staff rely on intelligence products and tools to support their analysis and decision making. FM 2-0 outlines products from IPB needed throughout the MDMP steps that are tailored to support commander's requirements and the operation. ATP 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield,* provides detailed information on the preparation of these products.

Against near-peer threats, gaining an understanding to synchronize and position forces properly requires multi-echelon intelligence analysis and support. Information gained provides an understanding of potential enemy

locations and conditions necessary to create a convergence of effects across multiple domains at these locations during important windows of time. In certain situations, stimulation of the enemy through operations maximizes the commander's decision space by providing a greater understanding at echelon at critical times of the friendly commander's choosing.

Deep maneuver enables the shaping and success of future operations; however, it also introduces increased risk to the force and risk to the mission. Based on how the division fights, the focus of stimulation and collection is the deep fight. Deep operations assume high levels of risk when employing simultaneous air or ground maneuver forces. Therefore, a dedicated and deliberate process must be established for air planning and reconnaissance. These distinct efforts require dedicated teams to develop and synchronize the enabling resources required for a division-level operation. Two missions in large-scale ground combat operations that are leveraged to gain intelligence, or to stimulate the enemy to gain intelligence, are deliberate attacks out of contact and reconnaissance in force.

Intelligence Support to Aviation Out of Contact Planning. The division artillery and air cavalry brigade (ACB) can contribute immeasurably early in the division fight to gain intelligence needed for follow-on operations. As a maneuver and targeting force, the ACB is an integral part of the division's daily scheme of maneuver while shaping for or supporting the main effort during each phase of the operation. The ACB is also critical to the scheme of intelligence support and scheme of fires because the ACB provides a significant amount of the division's intelligence and fires, respectively. In the deep area, the ACB conducts deliberate attacks or nightly air assaults in a high-threat environment based on intelligence gained through the integration of intelligence from across the entire enterprise.

Photo provided by 1st Air Cavalry Brigade

The strength of the pack! Air Cavalry Troopers train and deploy to conduct expeditionary aviation operations in support of unified land operations, combined arms maneuver, and wide area security to ensure the success of the 1st Cavalry Division.

The ACB S-2 and division artillery S-2 teams are fully incorporated into the larger division intelligence enterprise through the analysis and control element (ACE) for parallel planning and analysis rather than separate planning efforts. For air mission planning, integration enables effects, joint suppression of enemy air defense, sequence, timing, and a shared understanding of the division commander's intent for the plan. Intelligence support and analysis priorities are coordinated between the division G-2 and ACB and division artillery S-2s. The ACB S-2 refines the air and air defense assessments, and the division artillery S-2 conducts an artillerization of the fires aspects of IPB for the entire division. The ACB S-2 must be connected with the ACB's aviation mission survivability officer (AMSO) and maintain the enemy integrated air defense (IAD) situation template with input from the ACE. Linkage with the AMSO is critical in order to maximize the special training, knowledge of friendly aviation tactics, and unique systems the AMSO uses to overcome enemy IAD capabilities. The IAD situation template must be updated continuously and reassessed to meet the need for time-sensitive out-of-contact attack to degrade antiaccess and area denial. The rapid suppression of the enemy air defense plan mitigates risk to friendly aviation assets. Because of the fast pace of operations in large-scale ground combat and limited time to exploit opportunities, the intelligence teams at each echelon must be engaged in their core competencies and nested with higher and subordinate organizations.

Support to Reconnaissance (Division Cavalry) in Force and Movement to Contact Planning. The IPB effort establishes a baseline understanding of the terrain and enemy early in the planning process. When the commander determines ahead of or during planning that the scheme of fires or maneuver requires a ground-based division cavalry squadron, the division staff develops a task organization to meet the commander's intent. If the intent is for an aggressive reconnaissance, planners will allocate a variety of enablers to help the division cavalry perform its role based on the given mission (reconnaissance in force, movement to contact, etc.).

Intelligence assets allocated to the division cavalry provide redundant collection beyond the coordinated fire line and short of the fire support coordination line. These intelligence assets support and integrate with the allocated direct support artillery, direct support attack aviation (with manned and unmanned teaming capability), engineer mobility, and air defense artillery. Given the intent of adversaries to deny

situational understanding, the fight for intelligence requires a task organization of enablers suitable for aggressive reconnaissance. Interdependent capabilities are allocated to the division cavalry to enable it to conduct forceful, aggressive reconnaissance with limited support from the division until a seam or gap is identified that the division and corps can exploit. The division artillery S-2 supports early artillerization of the enemy counterreconnaissance and fires enterprise alongside the division cavalry S-2. The ACE provides intelligence updates to the templated versus confirmed enemy situation template. The event template of radars and artillery positions affecting the division cavalry are included in discussions of division cavalry operations. This provides reactive counterfire and employs information operations and cyberspace electromagnetic activities to mitigate risk from the enemy's holistic indirect fire network for increased survivability.

Leveraging the Event Template to Refine Predictive Analysis. Do not get drawn into the "current fight" at the expense of gaining an understanding of the next one by establishing processes to deliberately review and update IPB and running estimates. To accomplish this, work to create shared knowledge among the functional elements within the intelligence team. Predictive analysis is gained by getting input and feedback from everyone in the intelligence process—the collection management team, targeting team, single-source intelligence discipline leads, and current operations, plans, and fusion. These teams provide input back into the IPB process to integrate intelligence gained into forward-thinking predictive analysis and collaborative outputs used to update the event template. The updated event template leads to further assessments, refined requirements, and gaps, all of which will require additional collection. Ultimately, enabling predictive analysis depends upon an accurate information collection plan and the effectiveness of the event template and event matrix.

The Common Intelligence Picture. Every echelon provides updates to the common intelligence picture. They should not be created independently. A common architecture underpinned with common systems and processes enables First Team intelligence to maxi-

mize lethality by taking full advantage of all the intellectual and analytic capacity of the division with minimal duplication of effort. This is challenging with multinational partners but not impossible. The division relies on corps to provide brigade-level fidelity of the enemy and terrain. Likewise, the division refines that assessment into battalion-level fidelity. Brigades refine the assessment into company-level fidelity. Battalions refine the assessment for platoons. These refinements are provided to both subordinates and higher headquarters. Higher headquarters reviews the subordinate unit refinements, assesses any divergences, and integrates its refinements into the intelligence estimate. The refinements should be maintained and distributed on the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) architecture and published in the Command Post Computing Environment. The primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan enables resilient mechanisms to have daily points of contact to send updates of the intelligence estimate. Regardless of the mode and medium of reporting, reports are sent using tactical transmission protocols (proper radio etiquette) based on the line format published in Annex B for the operation.

A special cross-staff, cross-domain assessment in IPB is the electronic preparation of the battlefield conducted by the ACE, signals intelligence, cyberspace electromagnetic activities, and G-6 teams. The division and subordinate headquarters conduct electronic preparation of the battlefield to integrate an understanding of electromagnetic activity in the electromagnetic spectrum. The staff conducts electromagnetic spectrum emissions assessments from all warfighting functions across multiple domains. The electronic preparation of the battlefield depicts emissions for friendly, neutral, and enemy in the operational environment into

Receive guidance on—	• Commander's intent • High-payoff targets • Attack criteria • Rules of engagement	• Lead time between decision points and target areas of interest • Combat assessment requirements
Develop—	• Modified combined obstacle overlay • Situation and event templates	• High-value targets • Information collection plan
Explain—	Threat courses of action, as part of war gaming, based on friendly courses of action: • Refine the event template • Assist in developing the high-payoff target list, target selection standard matrix, and attack guidance matrix	
Produce—	Collection management tools	
Collect—	Information for target nomination, validation, and combat assessment	
Disseminate—	• High-payoff target-related information and intelligence to the fires cell or appropriate location immediately • Pertinent information and battle damage assessment in accordance with standard operating procedures or other instructions	

Intelligence Support to Targeting[4]

a single electromagnetic spectrum common operational picture. The output of the electronic preparation of the battlefield is a predictive assessment of expected enemy electromagnetic spectrum presence based on the IPB event template. This emissions event template enables the cross-staff integration of efforts in the electromagnetic pulse in numerous processes and activities such as information collection and targeting within headquarters and with higher, subordinate, supporting, and supported units.

Intelligence Support to Targeting. Intelligence support to targeting is the culmination of the entire intelligence cycle. Time (of response to information) is the unit of measure to assess the lethality of intelligence. In large-scale ground combat operations, seconds matter. Winning decisively is to destroy the enemy before the enemy has the option to do the same. All things being equal, the time it takes to generate intelligence strongly correlates to the lethality generated. This statement is true at each echelon. It is imperative to fight aggressively for intelligence.

Training Focus Area 3: Synchronize Information Collection Operations

The third training focus area is how the intelligence teams operationalize the information collection processes as an integrated function for planning, targeting, and operations. Information collection planning to make contact with the enemy or key terrain at the right time and place involves the integration of all assets of supported units, coordination between external and internal elements, and synchronization with operations and targeting. Fully nesting information collection takes significant practice and training. Intelligence leaders must execute a focused application of collection requirements management to support operations and targeting in dynamic conditions. Division intelligence efforts support the targeting of critical points to leverage deep maneuver planned in the division's overall scheme of maneuver. The division's information collection maximizes collection opportunities to collect and target exposed enemy positions.

Concept of Intelligence Support. During training and exercises, the division command nodes and subordinate units must train, certify, and validate their role in executing the concept of intelligence support to integrate and synchronize efforts with the scheme of fires and maneuver. The overall concept of intelligence support involves maximizing the use of multiple command post nodes and subordinate headquarters to develop and assess specific intelligence areas of focus based on planning horizons and assets. The intent is to maximize an in-depth look in areas with specialty, as well as capitalizing on existing requirements. Responsibilities for each group are as follows:

- ✦ The division ACE is responsible for the overall intelligence picture, integration with corps and lateral divisions, and primary analytical input for all single-source intelligence.

- ✦ The division tactical command post is responsible for conducting intelligence analysis within the close fight, ensuring targeting and collection is aligned with operations in the next 72 hours, and maintaining a battlefield visualization for the deputy commanding general for maneuver.

- ✦ The support area command post intelligence fusion cell is responsible for conducting threat assessments within the rear area, integrating with the maneuver enhancement brigade intelligence cell, and maintaining a battlefield visualization for the deputy commanding general for support.

- ✦ The division artillery headquarters is responsible for determining and visualizing the enemy artillery picture. This includes the enemy's most lethal artillery assets or groupings, counterfire analysis, cross-boundary enemy fires, and potential locations of brigade artillery groups, divisional artillery groups, and integrated fires command assets.

- ✦ The ACB headquarters is responsible for assessing the composite surface to air threat, to include identifying enemy air mobility corridors and enemy air threats, and providing battle damage assessment for friendly air attack missions.

Over several days 1ˢᵗ Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1ˢᵗ Cavalry Division leaders, through the military decision-making process, planned and rehearsed for Combined Resolve, a live-fire exercise as part of their Atlantic Resolve rotation across Europe, which is to improve the interoperability between U.S. forces and their North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies and partners.

These shared roles and assessments, visualizations, and products are synchronized during the twice-daily G-2/S-2 synchronization meetings.

Intelligence Architecture Underpinning Information Collection. Division command posts require agile, resilient, and redundant architecture to increase survivability and mobility. Intelligence leaders must know how to employ adaptive physical hardware, virtual software and data management, and conceptual processes' design techniques to build capacity and agility at each echelon to be more mobile, survivable, and redundant. This complex array of connections is the core of the intelligence enterprise and requires deliberate training and design to know how to leverage national to tactical intelligence capabilities that can support tactical operations down to the battalion level. To establish an effective intelligence architecture, it is important to understand some key aspects and limitations of all intelligence architectures.

All intelligence leaders have a role in increasing their professional knowledge of the DCGS–Army (DCGS–A) family of systems and integrated capabilities. Leaders must understand the interoperability of the Mission Command System and DCGS–A systems and maintain the relevant training and toolsets to transition between transport layers to properly employ PACE from the upper-tactical internet to the lower-tactical internet. They must also capture knowledge of the dissemination of data through services in standard operating procedures for the leader's respective element. While not part of the intelligence architecture, it is important for intelligence leaders to understand the way units communicate using the different transport layers to understand how to design that architecture. Key transport layers include the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical/Army Data Network, Modular Communications Node-Advanced Enclave, Trojan Network, and Installation as a Docking Station. The division intelligence architecture is integrated with the national to tactical intelligence dissemination architecture to ensure global connectivity using available broad-

cast and network services to deliver intelligence supporting targeting, threat warning, and situational awareness.

Closing Thoughts

How we fight the intelligence enterprise relies on trained and validated processes to maintain intelligence operations and processes across the entire division. Unlike the last 20 years of warfighting, large-scale ground combat operations require greater multi-echelon systems and processes synchronized across time and space. Achieving the delivery of timely, accurate, predictive, and precise intelligence occurs only through the synchronization of intelligence operations at each echelon with the reconnaissance, maneuver, and fires planning efforts.

We cannot train on the fight we want; rather, we must prepare for the fight we do not want. The enemies of this Nation will not fight fair or hold back capabilities just because we do not have the training and resources in our formations to counter. In fact, we must drill with absolute rigor in training to get leaders to explore novel ways to counter emerging enemy capabilities—current and projected. The past offers clues to the complexity of future conflict against peer and near-peer threats, but we cannot rely on the past to give comfort that we are ready to refight these battles. The nature of conflict is changing. In the fight against these threats, intelligence leaders must navigate challenges facing the intelligence enterprise from national to tactical in ways not required since the Cold War.

Endnotes

1. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 6 October 2017). Change 1 was issued on 6 December 2017.

2. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 31 July 2019), 2-17.

3. Department of the Army, FM 2-0, *Intelligence* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 6 July 2018), 1-20 (common access card login required).

4. Ibid., 2-11.

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